A SUBJECTIVE THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
To come to the conclusion that it was within Ottawa's jurisdiction to enact the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, LaForest and his supp orters effectively assumed an unfettered au thority to rew rite the rules of co nstitutional law according to their own personal views about what mix of environmental laws would work best for the country. LaForest's judgment broke new ground and redefined the rules of co nstitutional law in at least two different ways. First, grounding the federal governmen t's control over the environment squarely in section 91(27) of the old British North America Act was quite unprecedented. The Court had never invoked the federal government's power over crimina l law in this way before. In previous cases in which it had reflected on the powers of the federal government (and the provinces) over the environm ent, the Court had relied either on more direc tly related heads of powe r like fisheries an d navigab le rivers or on its residual power to make laws for "the peace, order and good government" of the country (POGG). Indeed, Hydro-Québec itself had bee n argued -both at the Supreme Court and in the lower courts -primarily on the basis of the federal governm ent's POGG power.
Not only did the majority look to a new source of authority for the federal government's jurisdiction in the field of environmental protection, in th e course o f its judgment it also effectively redefined the scope of the federal government's power to enact criminal laws. The definition of the federal government's powers over criminal law had been settled by the case law for almost fifty years and consisted, in the words of Peter Hogg, of a "requirement of form as well as a typically criminal objective." 2 According to a long and unbroken line of cases, criminal laws characteristically took the shape of a prohibition and penalty. On this definition, public welfare offenses like those in C.E.P.A., that are part of complex regulatory regimes that rely on administrative rulings and discretionary powers, are not regarded as true crimes and cannot, the refore, be gro unded in s ection 91(2 7).
LaForest did refer to the two part -formal and 
A CATEGORICAL THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Not only did LaForest's definition of the federal government's power over criminal law rewrite a test that had been acc epted for alm ost half a cen tury, it simultaneo usly resurrected the old and discredited conception of a constitution being made up of a number of very sharp ly defined c ategories or ru les. On this "classical" view, each of the heads of po wers listed in sections 91 and 92 are discrete and independent grants of law making authority, each with its own standards and tests. In Hydro-Québec, the majority played a variation on this theme by drawing a sharp distinction between the federal government's residual (POGG) and criminal law (section 91 (27)) powers and the principles or rules they contain, and then arguing that considerations of provincial autonomy and the balance between federal and provincial powers that were relevant under the former, were not germane to its analysis under the latter. 6 On their definition of section 91(27), the only concern of the Co urt is the legitimacy of the ends or purposes that the law seeks to achieve. Central to the Court's analysis in Crown Zellerbach 7 and Oldman River, 8 concerning the scope of the federal government's ability to enact environmental legislation under its residual (POGG) and other environmental heads of power, was consideration of the means chosen by government to pursue its goals. Working in the separate category of section 91(27), factors such as how deeply the legislation impinges on provincial jurisdiction, or how effectively provincial authorities might regulate the emission of toxic substances into the environm ent, simply d rop out of sig ht.
Here again the four dissenting judges pressed the majority, to no avail, to address the impact this legislation would have on the principle that environmental protection was a matter of co ncurrent, ov erlapping, shared jurisdiction that earlier cases like Crown Zellerbach and Oldman River had articulated. 9 Their objections to the "striking breadth" 10 of the "wholesale regulation .... of any and all substances which may harm any aspect of the environme nt" 11 were said by the majority to be "overstated."
12 The minority were told that issues respecting the federal structure of the constitution "do not arise with anything like the sam e intensity in rela tion to the criminal law powe r" 13 as they do inside the residual (POGG) clause. Ra ther than ha ving their arg uments addressed directly on their merits, they were met with a judgmen t of dismissal a nd denial.
Building different tests of constitutiona l validity into the different heads of power in section 91 fits hand and glove with a subjective theory of law. Making each section a separate and distinct category gives each judge a discretion as to which part of constitution w ill govern a case and so effec tively control which rules of constitutional law will ap ply. With out any ob ligation to explain or justify why a law like C.E.P.A. is evaluated under one head of power rather than another, each judge is able to choose the category and the constitutional test that will allow the m to come to the conclusion that is most consistent with their own personal and political views about the case.
When one finishes reading the two lengthy judgments that were w ritten in the case , it is hard not to ex perience the feeling that Canadian federalism law has returned to the same sorry state that it has b een in for m ost of its existence. Generations of constitutional law teachers have 3
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taught that artificial catego ries and rigid ru les lead to arbitrary distinctions and inconsistent decisions 14 and yet here is the Court a t it again. Although there was a brief moment during Brian Dickson's tenure as Chief Justice when an effort was made to find common principles and tests in the large grants of power to the federal government in POGG and section 91 (2) (trade & commerce), 15 that insight now seem s to have been lost. It is as if we are back at the beginning: no lessons learned; no progress made; the "living tree" once again threatened with ossification.
A PRINCIPLED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The sense of frustration and disappointment that many will feel when they reflect on the reasoning the majority gave for its conclusion that Ca nada's Environmental Protection Act is constitutional will be heightened when they think about other ways the C ourt might have validated such an important piece of social policy. It turns out that no t only did the C ourt not hav e to turn the clock back and repeat the mistakes of the past, it missed an opportunity to clarify and refine the principles it had used to reconcile federal/provincial powers over the environment in its earlier, landmark rulings in Crown Zellerbach and Oldman River. Had the Cou rt respected its earlier precedents and assessed the constitutionality of C.E.P.A. under POGG, not only could it have validated the federal government's objective of establishing minimum national stan dards aga inst toxic pollution, it could have dem onstrated an d elaborate d how the principle of provincial ina bility (or subsid arity as it is know n in other parts of the world), 16 that the federal governm ent is required to meet when it acts under the authority of the residual clause, establishes an objective and norm atively attractive standard for coordinating federal and provincial initiatives on this or indeed any other matter of common concern.
Although the four dissenting judges did consider whether the Act and the regulations could be justified as a valid exercise of the federal government's powers under POGG and, in particular, the 'national concern' doctrine that it had elaborated in Crown Zellerbach, 17 they never turned their minds to the "provincial inability" test and considered whether it could be sa tisfied in this case. They said C.E.P.A. could n ot meet the test of 'singleness and indivisibility' that the Court had established in Crown Zellerbach and so it was unnece ssary for them to consider whether the provinces could effectively deal with the emission of toxic substances into the environm ent. 18 Had they treated the question of provincial ability as part of the singleness and indivisibility test -as the Court had defined it in Crown Zellerbach -it is hard to imagine that the four dissenting judges w ould not ha ve seen the logic of minimum national standards governing the emission of toxic substances into the environment and the corresponding risk of allowing each province to establish its own floor.
There was a lot of evidence before the Court to support a finding of provincial inability to effective ly control the spread o f toxic substa nces. First, there was an extensive body of scientific evidence that showed that toxic substances are generally very mobile and that their polluting effects are highly diffuse and extend beyond provincial borders. 19 The "extra" or "inter" provincial character of toxic pollution, means that only the federal government has the capacity to deal effectively with the problem. Moreover, the Court has long recog nized that, in circumstances of this kind, the federal government can also regulate related matters of purely internal or "intra" provincial concern w here it is necessary to ensure the integrity of its regulation of the "extra" provincial aspect of the matter. That was the position th e Court im plicitly adopted in its endorsement of federal regulation of Canada's wheat trade 20 and explicitly em braced in General Motors 21 where it held that federal regulation of competition rules included purely local, intraprovincial trade.
In addition to the scientific evidence which the Court could have relied on to satisfy the provincial inability (or subsidiarity) tes t, there also was evidence that suggested that even if the provinces w ere constitutionally authorized to control the emissions of toxic substances, in this case they had demonstrated they lacked the political w ill to do so. The idea th at "unwillingness" c ould cons titute "inability" had some recognition in the cases 22 and in the 14 reflections of commentators 23 and was suggested in this case by the fact that Quebec had not taken advantage of the provisions in C.E.P.A . that allowed it to enact its own "equivalen t" regulations controlling the emission of toxic substances. On this definition, unless and until the Quebec government took some initiative to protect its own environment from the po lluting effects of to xic substances, the federal go vernmen t legitimately cou ld argue that it was necessary and therefore justified in enforcing its own regulations.
THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Because the outcome of the case is so conge nial with most people's political instincts, it is easy to overlook or forgive the fact that, jurisprudentially, Hydro-Québec poses a serious thre at to the integrity of the country's federal structure and to the rule of law. The decision of the majority puts at risk the federal principle and the idea that both levels of government have a role to play protecting the environ ment. If Parlia ment can justify everything it does under its power to make criminal law, provincial authority over even local aspects of the environment will depend on the sufferance of federal officials. Such a sweeping authorization of law making authority, combined with a para mountcy rule which gives precedence to federal enactments whenever they conflict with parallel provin cial laws, 24 effectively would allow the federal government to dictate to the provinces what their environmental protection policies would be. As a practical matter it would reverse the Court's earlier rulings on the environment and give the federal government exclusive jurisdiction in the field.
In addition to the damage it inflicts on the federal structure of the constitution, LaForest's judgment strips law of the objectivity and determinacy on which its integrity depends. Premised on the idea that constitutional law consists of a series of separate categories and rules, each with its own standards and tests that the judges are free to choose from in evaluating the laws they are asked to review, the majority's opinion defines law in terms of the politics and personal predictions of each jud ge. We know from the huge swings in the jurisprudence of the Privy Counc il that this highly subjective, categorical conception of judicial review leads to a jurisprudential wasteland. It generates a body of case law in which the principles and doctr ines 'march in pairs' to recall Paul Weiler's characterization of the Court's work twenty five years ago. 25 Conceiving of constitutional review as judges choosing which categories and rules to apply in any particular case leads to a jurisprudence with deep fault lines that produce very arbitrary and inconsistent results.
Even though it is hard not to think of Hydro-Québec as the jurisprudential equivalent of a serious spill of to xic waste, it is possible that its polluting effects may only be temporary and will not endure for long. With the early retirement of Gérard LaForest and the untimely death of John Sopinka, it is possible that the two new justicesMichel Bastarache and Ian Binnie -will reject the classical, categorical approach to the law that the majority embraced and lead the Court b ack to the understanding of constitutional law as consisting of broad rules of rationality (subsidiarity) an d proportio nality (scale of impact) that the Dickson Court had started to dev elop in Crown Zellerbach and General Motors. Regrettably, because of the way we select ju dges to sit on the Court, we do not know and had no say in whether that will be the ca se. If we had had the righ t to question Bastarache and Binnie about their views on the classical approach to the law, we could have ma de certain the precedential impact of Hydro-Québec was short lived.
Candidates who fav oured the re asoning o f the majority would jeopardize their chances for confirmation. Anyone who would defend the analysis offered by LaForest and his supporters would have to show s uch little respect for the Court's own prior rulings and the integrity of law as to raise serious doubts ab out their qua lifications to sit on the country 's highest co urt.
